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Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation 
RICHARD J. ALDRICH* 
 
Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation appears to have been considerably 
enhanced over the past three years. Both intra-European and EU–US intelligence 
cooperation were substantially expanded in the wake of 9/11.1 Most visibly, Operation 
Eagle Assist provided additional European AWACS aircraft to protect the United States, 
releasing American aircraft for duty elsewhere;2 and in late September 2001 Europol, a 
relatively young institution, was designated a central point for data exchange between 
European law enforcement agencies and the United States.3 More recently, prompted by 
the bomb attack on Madrid earlier in the month, the EU summit of 25–26 March 2004 
agreed on a Europe-wide security coordinator and Gijs de Vries was appointed to this 
new post under Javier Solana.4
Such appearances of closer cooperation, however, are only superficial; at a more 
fundamental level, significant problems remain. Concerted efforts to improve intelligence 
exchange on terrorism have been in train since the 1970s. Indeed, some have argued that 
substantial western intelligence cooperation—often referred to as liaison—has its roots in 
nineteenth-century efforts to exchange information on Sikh, Fenian and anarchist groups 
that were committed to violence.5 Yet despite decades of joint activity, transatlantic 
intelligence cooperation continues to present awkward challenges. These problems have 
become more substantial with NATO enlargement and EU expansion. 
The traumatic events of 11 March 2004 in Madrid underlined the opportunities 
offered to terrorists and criminals by hesitant or partial intelligence exchange. Some of 
the suspects in the Madrid bombing had been of interest to the French and Spanish police 
in 2001 but had been released for lack of evidence. By 2003, two of them were on a list 
of suspects issued by the Moroccan police for a series of café bombings in Casablanca, 
but were nevertheless living openly in Madrid. Retrospective investigation has turned up 
further information on their connections in Germany and Norway. Each country seemed 
to have a few pieces of a widely spread puzzle.6 More remarkably, during early April 
2004, the inability of the United States to provide Germany with access to a member of 
Al-Qaeda arrested in Pakistan and held by the US at an undisclosed location, contributed 
to the early release of Mounir el-Motassadeq, an important suspect who was before the 
courts in Hamburg on charges relating to the 9/11 attack.7 
Intelligence and security cooperation continues to be problematic because there is 
a fundamental tension between an increasingly networked world, which is ideal terrain 
for the new religious terrorism, and highly compartmentalized national intelligence-
gathering. The networked world is a well-known (or at least well-recognized) aspect of 
globalization. Compartmentalized national intelligence-gathering is less well understood. 
Compartmentalization occurs for two reasons. First, western secret services rightly place 
a high premium on protecting their sources. Second, western states have different notions 
of privacy and so resist large-scale data-sharing. Source-protection is such a firmly 
established convention that it is unlikely to change; as a consequence, secret services will 
not move towards sharing high-grade ‘killer punch’ intelligence material on anything but 
a selective and bilateral basis. However, more routine background intelligence must be 
shared at a faster rate, and to achieve that we require a better mutual understanding about 
the relationship between privacy and security. In particular we will need improved 
benchmarks regarding what sort of intelligence should be shared and how it will be 
managed. Developing an improved conceptual framework within which to tackle the 
necessary trade-offs between security and privacy is essential for closer transatlantic 
cooperation. 
 The mismatch between the narrow national focus of recent inquiries into 
intelligence-related episodes and the growing importance of multinational cooperation 
has further clouded our understanding in this area. The 9/11 Commission has probed 
bureaucratic divisions within the United States only. In the UK, the Hutton inquiry 
enjoyed an even narrower remit. The same has been true of lower-profile reviews in 
countries as diverse as Denmark and Australia.8 Arguably, because of the networked 
nature of the new threats, the primary concern should be weaknesses in international 
cooperation, not in national structures. The good news is that cooperation is possible, 
even between countries that do not like each other and even at times when transatlantic 
tensions are high. The better news is that new forms of cooperation are emerging, 
particularly among the countries of Europe. The primary lesson here is that the focus 
needs to be on speeding up means of practical exchange on operational matters, not on 
building elaborate new structures. Ultimately, the politics of intelligence is a practical 
one, with a ‘pay as you go’ culture in which the main producers will not relinquish their 
accustomed dominance to new multilateral organizations set up by the EU—or by anyone 
else. 
 Many transatlantic institutions were created during the Cold War at a time when 
international events moved more slowly. Accordingly, neither NATO nor the EU is 
accustomed to acting with the speed required by effective counterterrorism operations. 
Expansion and enlargement will render these bodies even more cumbersome. 
Nevertheless, as this article suggests, the EU has important contributions to make at the 
level of law enforcement and improved security, while NATO is taking significant strides 
at the level of military intelligence cooperation with new members. Moreover, the sense 
of urgency generated by the bombings in Istanbul and Madrid is accelerating measures 
that will have important consequences for wider transatlantic intelligence cooperation 
against drugs, organized crime, people trafficking and other security threats.9 
 Intelligence and security services, as their name implies, are designed to provide a 
supporting ‘service’ to other operational and policy mechanisms; and indeed, 
transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation connects with almost every aspect of 
the western alliance. However, in the past three years it is, specifically, terrorism that has 
exercised a transformative effect on this area, and accordingly the focus here is on efforts 
to respond to that challenge. The article begins by seeking to advance a more nuanced 
understanding of the trade-offs between security and liberty that might be applied to new 
provisions for data retention or exchange within the NATO alliance. Thereafter it 
proceeds sequentially, asserting that these provisions will apply differently across three 
distinct types of intelligence activity. The secret services are primarily focused on 
prevention and counteraction; therefore the material that they share is unlikely to arrive in 
the public domain, or manifest itself in court proceedings. By contrast, police 
intelligence, telecom data and passenger records present problems associated with wider 
access and judicial implications. Military intelligence is different again, although this too 
is increasingly harnessed to the wheel of counterterrorist interventions. The article 
suggests that almost all the problems of intelligence exchange in these three areas are 
resolvable. However, the challenge of arriving at a joint agreement as to what the shared 
intelligence means in broad terms is more problematic. Although some prominent 
commentators have suggested that shared NATO strategic intelligence estimates would 
enhance alliance cohesion, the last section of this article argues that they would be 
difficult to achieve and of doubtful effectiveness. 
 
Security, privacy and anonymity 
The most serious challenge confronting transatlantic intelligence cooperation is 
identifying an appropriate fulcrum that allows us to continue to balance security and 
liberty. Gijs de Vries has characterized this problem as improving security while 
respecting fundamental freedoms. He has avowed his intention not only to preserve 
European liberties but also to find a way to build upon them. These are fine words, but 
the practice is likely to be difficult. As Michael McDowell, the Irish justice minister, has 
conceded, security pressures will require access to more data by an ever wider range of 
security officials. If reluctance to share intelligence contributes to serious security 
failures, the public will be highly intolerant of those who obstructed a free flow of data.10 
 Although the legal bases for the regulation of both intelligence and privacy in 
Europe and the United States are different, there are significant points of commonality. 
The most important is the idea of ‘proportionality’. Whether an instance of proposed 
surveillance is assessed by a middle manager in Whitehall, or whether a request is being 
made before a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in Washington, the underlying 
principle dictates that the degree of intrusion be kept proportionate to the threat 
confronting the civil population. Although sometimes applied imperfectly, this 
framework has served democratic states on both sides of the Atlantic as a benchmark for 
many years. In Europe, the growing incorporation of ECHR provisions has only served to 
strengthen this principle. However, proportionality is now an increasingly difficult 
concept to apply in the face of a new kind of terror, which has no upper limit. In the face 
of the threat of a strategic terrorist attack the difficult question to answer is, how much 
surveillance is enough?11 
 It is improbable, and indeed unfair, to expect the intelligence and security services 
to resolve these difficulties. Such choices are not matters for security chiefs, or even for 
ministers: they are matters of social choice and require serious and extended public 
debate. The idea of proportionality remains important and will continue to offer a 
benchmark for intelligence services’ operational activities for the foreseeable future. 
Proportionality is bolstered by the test of ‘necessity’, or whether the same information 
can secured by more innocuous means. Institutional capacity often imposes additional 
and very practical restraints in a business which is resource-intensive. However, at a 
more strategic level none of these ideas offer the policy-makers much guidance as they 
attempt to make their way through the labyrinthine maze of intelligence alliances and 
international data-sharing arrangements. What material should be shared and how freely? 
And where might we look for additional signposts to guide policy-makers? 
 One of the problems that has bedevilled thinking about the balance between 
security and liberty has been weak definition. In particular, public debate over new 
security measures has tended to confuse the distinct subjects of secrecy, privacy and 
anonymity. If the transatlantic community is to protect core freedoms and essential civil 
rights it needs a more sophisticated understanding of what we are attempting to protect. 
Historical sociologists would be quick to point out that ideas concerning state security 
mechanisms belong to particular epochs no less than those relating to military strategy. 
We currently enjoy a range of security mechanisms inherited from the Cold War, and 
these must be reshaped to address new problems set against the background of 
globalization. Accordingly, we could do worse than consider how successive conceptions 
of secrecy, privacy and anonymity have changed over time. Protests against new 
counterterrorist measures are frequently advanced on the basis that the tariff for more 
security is an unacceptable degrading of our freedoms. However, a longer-term 
perspective would allow us to be more discerning in our approach, selecting measures 
that do not significantly erode core privacy but which are designed to reduce the dangers 
of anonymity.12 
 In the pre-industrial era, the majority of human beings lived in villages. Set within 
this largely rural landscape, citizens enjoyed privacy but not anonymity. Activities within 
their own domestic sphere were largely invisible to their neighbours, but as they went 
about their business they were known to their community and their purpose was 
understood. Strangers entering a village were quickly identified and, in a civil way, the 
nature of their business was established. Although it is easy to exaggerate the bucolic 
innocence of this rural idyll, the important point in the present context was that there was 
little anonymity, and if a crime was committed, the identity of the perpetrator was often 
known to some section of the community. However, industrialization radically changed 
this pattern. Industrialists desired the free movement of landless labour while the 
authorities feared mobile populations. The pressures of attendant urbanization upon the 
domestic sphere eroded privacy, while extending vast anonymity in the form of the 
faceless urban crowd, wherein those of ill intent could cloak themselves. Although states 
responded with police forces, the introduction of passports and fingerprinting, these 
measures moved at a constabulary pace and industrialization was usually more than one 
step ahead.13
 In the twenty-first century, globalization continues to accelerate this process. In 
common parlance we often refer to the information revolution as shrinking time and 
distance and so creating something that we are pleased to refer to as the ‘global village’. 
However, globalization has not delivered a ‘global village’. Instead it has produced a 
global mega-metropolis in which there is vast anonymity and diminished privacy. Our 
new security regimes and the way in which we share data must be carefully configured to 
reverse this trend. Attainment of anything like a global village is still far away from us, 
but the instinctive attractiveness of this term perhaps points the way ahead, towards a 
place where privacy is better preserved, while the scale of anonymity is reduced.14 
 Knowing who someone is, why they are in a particular public space and what 
their business is does not require intrusive surveillance. Knowing what their religious 
affiliation is, what food they prefer, what their bank balance is and what they said to their 
spouse on the telephone last week is, by contrast, much more invasive and trespasses 
upon their privacy. Although privacy is a curiously existential concept, nevertheless the 
preservation of the boundary between the public and the private is at the core of what 
defines the liberal state. Many of the new security measures under consideration across 
Europe and North America, including biometric passports, will not erode privacy, but 
they will curtail dangerous anonymity and protect individuals from the unpleasant 
practice of identify theft. By contrast, other measures, such as those that involve the 
transfer or agglomeration of large amounts of personal information from many different 
databases, including commercial sources, constitute a more substantial threat to privacy. 
We need to keep these distinctions in mind. Judicious use of information 
technology, together with discriminating and sensible patterns of intelligence 
cooperation, will take us a long way in our efforts to protect transatlantic society. In other 
words, if we can get this right, the activities of security and intelligence organizations 
need not erode the qualities of freedom in a democracy; instead they can sustain and 
extend our liberties. 
 
Secret intelligence and the civilian agencies 
The leading elements in the effort to counterterrorism are the most secret. These are the 
civilian intelligence and security services of the larger states in North America and 
Europe. In this domain the overwhelming emphasis is upon tight security for information 
being exchanged, and this is not unhelpful in our search for enhanced privacy. 
Intelligence exchange between these organizations is a world within a world, governed 
by its own diplomacy and characterized by elaborate agreements, understandings and 
treaties. The main substance of these agreements focuses upon the security of intelligence 
rather than intelligence exchange itself, and reflects concern over how that intelligence 
will be circulated within each national system. This, in turn, fosters an attitude of intense 
caution towards the idea of sharing, and especially towards multilateral sharing. 
Moreover, in Europe and the United States, secret services are often close to the core 
executive and so associated with ideas of sovereignty. States will happily place some of 
their military forces under allied command, but hesitate to act similarly in the area of 
intelligence, where coordination rather than control is the most they will accept. This 
resistance to the multilateral pooling of very sensitive data, on security grounds and wider 
concerns about sovereignty, will prevent both an unhealthy agglomeration of secret data 
and the rise of a federal super secret service. What we are seeing instead is a focused 
effort to cooperate more quickly on specific cases or to exchange limited data more 
effectively. 
 The most remarkable example of cooperation is the English-speaking effort in the 
realm of signals intelligence (sigint) known as UKUSA.15 Sharing in this realm between 
the United States, the UK, Australia and Canada is so complete that national product is 
often indistinguishable. But this is an Anglo-Saxon rather than a transatlantic partnership; 
moreover, the institutional linkage between UKUSA and continental European states has 
diminished, rather than grown, over the last decade. The United States has withdrawn 
some sigint assets from Germany and relocated them within the UK. The Dutch have 
advocated a stronger national sigint capability after a disappointing experience with 
multinational sharing in the Balkans.16 The French have attempted to interest other 
European states in serious investment in a parallel European system for both sigint and 
satellite imagery, but without success. With no one to share the mounting costs, Paris was 
recently forced to cancel its Zenon sigint satellite programme.17 London remains firmly 
oriented towards the United States, in part because it provides the UK with intelligence as 
a ‘loss leader’; there is a recognition in Washington that this removes the attraction of 
alternative Europeanist ventures. The sigint agencies do not have a monopoly on 
technical interception. Security services also play a growing role, focusing on e-mail; and 
here too, the sharing of sensitive intelligence remains largely a UK–US affair. The sheer 
scale of the apparatus employed by the United States explains why the United States 
remains the most important bilateral partner for the UK’s Security Service.18
 Unsurprisingly, intelligence cooperation is partly about building confidence, and 
the time-line is necessarily long. Western security services have been developing their 
associations for decades and these are now growing in importance. These security 
networks exchange less sensitive data, background studies, scenario analyses and policy 
views. As early as the 1960s the English-speaking countries began a compartmentalized 
security alliance called ‘CAZAB’ that searched for evidence of high-level Soviet 
penetration. In the 1970s a wider group of countries began two intelligence-sharing 
systems on Middle Eastern terrorism codenamed ‘Kilowatt’ and ‘Megaton’.19 But 
perhaps the most enduring of these arrangements has been Europe’s Berne Group, 
formed in 1971 and sometimes called the ‘Club of Berne’. Initially consisting of only six 
European security agencies, including the UK’s Security Service, the French DST, the 
German BfV and the Swedish SÄPO, it now numbers 17 members, the most recent 
adherent being Greece. This is more than a lunch club: the heads of the services meet 
twice a year for formal security summits. The Berne Group has it own communications 
network administered by the UK and several working groups on subjects such as 
terrorism, organized crime and interception. These are also joint training courses for 
younger staff. All this joint activity contributes to a further vital function, the building of 
mutual confidence and trust.20
 Little publicity has been given to successful European security intelligence 
cooperation immediately preceding 9/11. In early 2001 intelligence indicators suggested 
that Osama bin Laden was planning a campaign of bomb attacks in Europe. Based on a 
‘well-functioning international exchange of information’ among the major security and 
intelligence services in Europe, a number of successful operations against persons within 
the bin Laden network were launched. By mid-April 2001, a total of eighteen individuals 
had been apprehended in a series of coordinated operations across Europe. During some 
of these, weapons and chemicals intended for the manufacture of explosives were seized. 
In other words, the long-established Berne Group was functioning fairly well.21
 However, successful as it may be, the Berne Group is not transatlantic and the 
United States is not a member. Accordingly, following 9/11 the Berne Group created a 
new organization called the Counterterrorist Group (CTG). This is a separate body with a 
wider membership of EU intelligence and security services together with the United 
States, Switzerland and Norway.22 The first meeting was held in November 2001 at The 
Hague, chaired by the Belgian security service. The main current product of this group is 
common threat assessments in the field of Islamic terrorism. Although CTG is not an EU 
organization and reports through national security services to each capital, nevertheless 
the national chair of CTG rotates in synchronization with the EU presidency and its threat 
analyses are made available to some high-level EU committees. During 2002 and 2003 
CTG devoted considerable energy to institutional matters and the problems of 
multilateral data exchange. CTG does not have a geographical headquarters, but is 
probably the most important focus of day-to-day cooperation. Current CTG discussions 
point towards a shared database with the next five years. This would not contain sensitive 
material, but would allow the collation of contextual intelligence on suspects. At its most 
recent meeting in Switzerland on 21 April 2004, the Berne Group decided that CTG 
should play the major role in implementing intelligence-related aspects of the European 
Council's Declaration on Combatting Terrorism that followed the attack on Madrid .23
 The new members of the EU and NATO render this picture more complex. 
Relations with the ‘new Europe’ have been handled through the Middle Europe 
Conference, a different collaborative network run by a number of West and Central 
European security services. This was set up at the suggestion of the Dutch security 
service in 1994 and played a long-term preparatory role in the accession to the EU in 
2004 of ten new countries.24 Its focus has been on accountability, political control and the 
role of security services in support of democratization rather than counterterrorism. It has 
also provided a useful forum for discussing issues relating to organized crime. On 1 May 
2004 these ten countries will join CTG as full members.25 
 Although some countries, notably Belgium and Austria, have recently made 
public calls for the creation of a Europe-wide FBI, EU expansion makes these improbable 
ambitions even more unlikely to be realized. Such proposals have for the most part come 
from states that have a limited national security intelligence capability and now feel 
vulnerbale.26 Capability is everything in the world of intelligence and all the pre-existing 
networks have their places in an established hierarchy. There is more competition than 
cohesion, with big producers dominating the networks and small producers remaining on 
the periphery. The major players, including the UK, like it this way, and so little will 
change. Typically, on 31 March 2004 the UK minister of state for Europe, Denis 
MacShane, emphasized that any EU-based intelligence activity should be limited to 
‘producing assessments at a more strategic level’, adding that the real work can ‘only be 
done within a national framework’. There would be more sharing of assessments, but 
ministers were ‘not acting to set up any kind of European intelligence agency in any 
way’.27 
 Publicly, Gijs de Vries has taken a similar line, portraying himself as a facilitator 
of cooperation rather than someone who is seeking to create bold new frameworks.28 
Privately, the EU has long-nurtured ambitions to expand its intelligence capability 
because this is the logical corollary of a common foreign and security policy. Recent 
efforts have been focused on the Joint Situation Centre or ‘Sitcen’. This is an analytical 
element that supports ‘Second Pillar’ or foreign policy activities. Its stated purpose is to 
provide early warning and conflict prevention information, with a focus on issues outside 
the EU.29 However, de Vries has now suggested that its capabilities need to be extended 
to the analysis of internal security issues, which are now inseparably linked to foreign 
policy. In early 2002 the Western European Union satellite centre near Madrid and an 
analytical centre, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), in Paris were transferred to EU 
supervision. In January 2004 ISS produced a paper advocating the further enhancement 
of European intelligence, focused on Sitcen. Currently, the focus on building up Sitcen is 
mostly about political symbolism and reassuring public opinion than Europe is working 
together to avert future terrorist attacks.30
 Liaison between European security services and the United States remains 
problematic.31 In the wake of 9/11 a large number of FBI agents arrived in Germany and 
began independent investigations, to the chagrin of their German hosts. There are now 
almost as many FBI as CIA personnel in Europe. The French have displayed sensitivity 
about the FBI’s interest in extending its influence in Eastern Europe through its 
International Law Enforcement Academy in Bucharest, interpreting this as encroachment 
into Europe’s backyard.32 Each country has its own peculiarities. Germany finds sharing 
security intelligence difficult because of awkward constitutional limitations and its 
federal structure. France has been beset by internal infighting between its own secret 
services. These complexities translate into myriad complex interfaces with the many 
competing American agencies located around Washington’s beltway.33
 The American intelligence community has long been noted for its lack of 
communal identity. Ingrained reluctance to share, together with incompatible data 
systems, was a key factor in explaining intelligence problems preceding 9/11. 
Washington has sought to counter this problem by the establishment of the Terrorist 
Threat Integration Centre (TTIC). Created in May 2003 to remedy the failure of US 
intelligence and law-enforcement agencies to communicate, the TTIC is an analytical 
centre tasked with collating data from more than a dozen American intelligence agencies 
and since June 2004 has enjoyed its own independent headquarters in Washington DC. 
However, the CIA retains it own rival Counterterrorism Center, while the Pentagon likes 
neither. The overwhelming pathologies within the American system remain the lack of an 
overall intelligence director who controls (rather than coordinates), the predominance of 
the military and the lack of an effective internal security service. These difficulties make 
liaison more difficult and none of them is likely to be resolved in the medium term. 
Perhaps they will eventually be addressed only in the wake of another major attack. 
 
Intelligence and law enforcement 
Intelligence gathered by police and customs officials represents a different realm wherein 
the focus is often investigation of crimes after they have occurred. Since the early1990s 
both the EU and the United States have been engaged in a prolonged, complex and 
somewhat sluggish programme of co-operation aimed at of tightening financial 
regulations, standardizing procedures for arrest and improving data exchange. Within 
Europe efforts have focused on the so-called ‘third pillar’ areas of justice and home 
affairs. Many supposedly ‘new’ security measures, whether national, European or 
transatlantic in scope, had been sitting around on the desks of security officials for a long 
time before 9/11. Ministers had been reluctant to take them forward until the new climate 
of emergency provided them with opportunities. Even in 2001, many of the EU measures 
taken against terrorism were framework decisions that did not require all member states 
to comply immediately; however, in March 2004 the process of compliance was 
dramatically accelrated.34
 The kind of intelligence that relates to law enforcement issues often appears 
pedestrian alongside some of the secret service activities discussed above; however, it 
cannot be overemphasized that dutiful collection and exchange of rather mundane data, 
sometimes merely open data such as names and addresses, often produces important 
results. In the 1970s, an Italian decision to enforce civil regulations requiring landlords to 
notify the authorities of the names of their tenants—an existing but neglected 
requirement—turned up many of the terrorist suspects currently being sought. At this 
level there are fewer problems with secrecy and source protection, but greater 
constitutional sensitivities, not least because some of the information transferred may end 
up being used against defendants in court. Moreover, names and addresses are one thing; 
private information is quite another. Some of the most recent EU–US agreements have 
permitted too much access to personal data by categories of officials that are extremely 
widely defined. This is a substantial threat to privacy and points to future trouble. 
 Perhaps wrongly, public attention has been drawn to new institutions and focused 
upon Europol, an organization set up in 1995 to enhance European police cooperation.35 
Immediately after 9/11 a new counterterrorism unit was announced at Europol, to which 
many European states despatched additional security liaison officers. At the same time 
Europol was designated the key point for the exchange of police intelligence data with 
the United States. By 6 December 2001 a grandly entitled ‘Strategic Cooperation 
Agreement’ had been reached between the United States and Europe, and by the summer 
of 2002 a liaison team of Europol officers was ensconced in the EU’s offices in 
Wsashington.36 However, Europol is a small organization and is often misunderstood. Set 
up to facilitate police cooperation between two or more willing partner states in particular 
investigations, it is not to be mistaken for an EU criminal intelligence agency. It has 
undertaken excellent work against drug-trafficking and people-smuggling, but Europol 
officials privately concede that a coherent anti-terror policy is beyond both its remit and 
its resources.37 It also found European secret services reluctant to offer them information 
in anything but a sanitized form, and so eventually its counterterrorism unit was 
reabsorbed into the more mainstream Organized Crime Department.38
 Much more important were the difficult negotiations with the United States over 
the exchange of personal data held by Europol. The transfer of police data is a legal 
minefield because of the very different structures of protection accorded to personal 
information in the United States, where the issue is one of legal precedent, and in Europe, 
where there are draconian data protection laws. Hitherto these differences have made the 
sharing of personal data almost impossible. Alex Türk, the EU data protection 
commissioner, led a team from the joint supervisory body of Europol that attempted to 
tackle this awkward issue. Their difficulties were compounded by the recognition that it 
would be unconstitutional for European officials to transfer data that might contribute to 
the use of the death penalty in the United States.39 In December 2002 an EU–US 
agreement was reached; but, based on weak and ad hoc reassurances offered on a case-
by-case basis, it is arguably highly problematic on several counts. Its provisions allow 
exchange of data on any offence; it allows the data to be provided to even local US 
authorities; and the restrictions on passing data on to third parties are weak. Most 
problematic of all, the categories of data include race, religious/political opinions and 
health information. In the UK, the House of Lords expressed alarm but the UK 
government chose to override its scrutiny process.40 Less well publicized was a similar 
package negotiated at the tenth EU–Russia summit on 11 November 2002, which 
included an information exchange agreement between Europol and the Russian security 
authorities.41 
 Equally problematic are draconian measures designed to give EU law-
enforcement officials access to computerized booking information held on travellers. 
Again, this includes sensitive personal data such as payment information, bank numbers, 
credit card data—even food preferences. This will allow the Europe-wide circulation of 
data that the EU had already agreed to hand over to US security agencies under 
agreements associated with airline passengers. Large neural network computers that use 
algorithmic data-mining in an attempt to spot suspicious events are notoriously hungry 
for this kind of personal data.42 Transport information also spotlights another important 
aspect of transatlantic intelligence-sharing. In a growing climate of commercial data 
surveillance (now dignified with its own neologism as ‘dataveillance’) much critical 
information is held by companies, such as airlines, rather than states. Trying to persuade 
United Airlines, British Airways and Air France to share commercially sensitive data 
about their customers was almost as difficult as national intelligence-sharing.43 
 Cooperation in tracking the financing of terrorism has been placed high on the 
agenda within both the EU and the UN.44 This priority resulted in a series of measures to 
freeze the assets of terrorist organizations. Within the EU the operational activities are 
undertaken by a small working group, based in Brussels, in bilateral cooperation with 
member states. Despite the creation of new frameworks for cooperation and better 
electronic databases of targeted persons, this work remains complex, detailed and slow. 
Although officials have worked hard in this area, the instruments remain unequal to the 
task. The fundamental framework remains the Financial Action Task Force set up by the 
G7 in 1989, which ideally should be replaced by a properly resourced international 
organization. There are already signs that suspects are moving towards informal financial 
transfers that will deny investigators valuable paper trails in the future.45 
Current EU proposals seek to retain telecommunications data, including records 
of mobile phone traffic, in all member states for an agreed minimum time to enable 
intelligence agencies to track calls. Although this has been controversial, it does not in 
fact involve holding transcripts or recordings of messages, but merely preserving caller 
information (although the two are linked in that some mobile telephone records can give 
the timed geographical location of callers). Currently, this area is beset by discrepancies. 
Sweden obliges its telecom companies to keep such records for only three months, the 
UK for one year, France for three years and Italy for five years. Other practical security 
cooperation measures which have yet to be implemented include the European common 
arrest warrant, whose enforceable provisions await enactment in Germany, Italy, Greece, 
Austria and the Netherlands. The EU-wide definition of terrorism has not yet been 
adopted by three member states, which have been urged to set out minimum sentences for 
terrorist crimes.46 
 In the longer term, the most important EU measure under discussion is the plan 
for a high-tech ID database using digital ‘biometric’ technology. The proposals before 
EU justice ministers include embedding EU identity documents with microchips 
containing digitized photographs and fingerprints. In practice this will entail 
fingerprinting for all EU citizens and the holding of this data on an EU database allowing 
the tracking of individuals. Dramatic as it may seem, this does not represent a substantial 
invasion of privacy and deserves to be given high priority. Significantly, this is not only 
an EU programme. The UK Home Secretary recently remarked that policy on 
identification cards and a database with biometrics was ‘part of the wider discussions 
which . . . are taking place with the G8 countries’.47 The primary focus is not advancing 
surveillance but merely regaining reasonable control of borders. Together with electronic 
border surveillance equipment, and CCTV and electronic data collection at air and 
seaports, these measures will allow the state to reclaim some lost ground and redress the 
balance somewhat in the face of increasingly mobile populations. 
 
Military intelligence and alliance capability 
Defence is one area where divergent alliance policies and priorities have a direct impact 
on the potential for intelligence cooperation. The United States sees military intervention 
as the dominant component of the war against terror and intelligence spending focused on 
supporting defence activity accordingly remains at the forefront of the American effort; 
European approaches are rather different. This divergence is not a new phenomenon and 
continues a trend visible throughout the 1990s. It is commonplace to remark that the 
United States is now engaged in a programme of military spending that is broadly 
equivalent to that of the rest of the developed world put together. Much of this spending 
is directed towards ‘Joint Vision 2020’, with the objective of creating a ‘networked 
battlespace’ in which ‘information dominance’ has been fully achieved.48 The American 
defence industry, in contrast to European firms, has been strongly encouraged to develop 
C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence). Moreover, the 
Pentagon is able to draw further strength from advances in commercial and civilian 
technologies in which the United States is a world leader. This predominance has 
profound consequences for the future of transatlantic military cooperation.49 
 These consequences are already visible. During the first Gulf War in 1991, French 
forces encountered severe difficulties with allied interoperability in the area of command 
and communications. In Bosnia and Kosovo the UK encountered similar problems. When 
planning Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001 the United States received 
many offers of military assistance from European partners but rejected most of them, 
preferring to avoid the restraints of a wide coalition and the burden of supporting weak 
allies in the field. Currently, decisions as to whether the US acts unilaterally or 
multilaterally are still partly political; in ten years’ time they will be largely determined 
by technology. As the result of the ‘revolution in military affairs’, the United States will 
find itself unable to interoperate with lesser forces, and NATO will find itself providing 
various forms of follow-on support, from medical services to military policing. In other 
words, the information and technology gap will relegate NATO to washing the dishes.50 
 This trend is accentuated by the US emphasis upon information warfare in all its 
guises. The United States is surging ahead towards its aim of ‘networked battlespace’, 
characterized by the extensive use of pilotless aircraft with real-time video and sigint 
packages. However, it is also dedicated to information warfare in two other respects. The 
first is information warfare as psychological operations, including flying television 
broadcast systems whose C-130 aircraft bear the eye-catching logo ‘we fire electrons not 
bullets’.51 More recently, the United States launched its satellite-based TV station 
broadcasting exclusively to the Middle East, Al Hurra. Explicitly designed to compete 
with Al-Jazeera, its programmes are beamed by satellite from a discreet two-storey black 
building in the suburbs of Springfield, Virginia. The second is ‘netwar’, defined as 
electronic attacks by one set of computers upon another. Both these aspects of 
information warfare are intelligence-related, and Europe has remarkably little capability 
in either.52
 Some might argue that in military terms such a transatlantic division of labour 
could make sense. European states have been proud of their specialist skill-sets right 
across the field of low-intensity conflict, counterterrorism, peacekeeping and 
humanitarian aid. All these activities are accompanied by specialist types of intelligence 
support and intelligence cooperation. Human intelligence, as much as technical systems, 
is at a premium in these situations. When the British army arrived in Kosovo, Richard 
Holbrooke exhorted them to do what they had done successfully in Northern Ireland. 
More recently, in Afghanistan, the United States has done most of the invading while the 
Europeans have been bequeathed the task of nation-building. Yet while this arrangement 
may be pragmatic, such a stark separation of roles will quickly corrode transatlantic 
solidarity.53
 Strenuous efforts are therefore being made to deal with the problem of 
interoperability. At the November 2002 Prague summit, NATO signed up to a new 
capabilities initiative which emphasized intelligence and related areas including 
surveillance, target recognition, command, control and communications. Meanwhile the 
once numerous NATO commands have now been rationalized into Allied Command 
Operations and Allied Command Transformation, the latter being based at Norfolk, 
Virginia and focused on new capabilities. Countries that place a high premium on 
integrated operations with the United States have already initiated defence reviews which 
focus higher levels of spending on information-led warfare. But notwithstanding these 
efforts, NATO will lack the core capabilities to work comfortably alongside the United 
States for some time to come. The Prague summit emphasized the creation of a NATO 
‘rapid reaction force’, but this is more likely to become a sort of glorified peacekeeping 
force.54
 NATO has other intelligence-related issues to worry about too. In common with 
the EU, much of its energy is currently focused on enlargement, which brings both 
problems and benefits. Within NATO, the intelligence and security aspects of 
enlargement are led by the longstanding NATO Special Committee (AC/46), in which the 
heads of the civil security services of the NATO member states participate. The 
leadership rotates annually, and in 2004 the Danes were in the chair.55 The Special 
Committee has held elaborate discussions about working with the security services of the 
countries that qualify as suitable candidates for NATO membership. Much has been 
learned from the integration of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 2002. At first 
sight some of the attendant tasks appear routine and administrative, including issues of 
personnel screening and cryptographic security.56 In practice, enforcing these procedures 
has been problematic. In early September 2003, Slovakia’s prime minister, Mikulas 
Dzurinda, attempted to fire his security chief, Jan Mojzis on the basis of vague and 
unspecified allegations. However, Mojzis and his National Office of Safety enjoyed 
strong British and American support as a consequence of having taken a hard line in 
granting permissions within Slovakia for handling classified NATO information. Indeed, 
Wayne Ryzchak, the head of the NATO Security Office visited Bratislava during this 
episode. Dzurinda was blocked by his own cabinet and only got his way after a second 
attempt. NATO has also put both Romania and Bulgaria under pressure to ‘clean house’ 
of people judged to be linked too closely with Russian intelligence, and also to introduce 
greater transparency.57 This has been accompanied by a great deal of quiet bilateral 
assistance offered by Germany, the Netherlands and the UK in terms of how modern 
secret services might relate to democratic institutions. Although this work has been 
discreet, it is likely to have beneficial long-term consequences for the political cultures of 
countries that were once terrified by their security organs.58
 Even more intractable are the legacies of economic problems in Eastern Europe. 
At the end of the Cold War many leading figures in intelligence, often the best and 
brightest in their own societies, began new careers in politics or business. In some cases 
this brought them into contact with organized crime. Some countries, such as the Czech 
Republic, reformed their services successfully, but others, notably the Baltic states, had 
little idea of how to do this, so that a corrupt version of the former KGB has remained in 
place. Even where officials are not involved directly in organized crime, salaries are so 
low that it is difficult to prevent the leakage of information to criminal organizations.59 
 Despite these problems, substantial intelligence dividends await NATO in the 
East. Former Warsaw Pact countries have excellent capabilities across the whole 
spectrum of intelligence-related activity.60 Some of their capabilities have already been 
deployed to substantial effect, the most widely publicized being the work of Polish 
special forces in southern Iraq during 2003. Most East European states are experts in 
electronic warfare and continue to spend to upgrade these capabilities. Poland has only 
recently acquired a new generation of military communications intelligence systems. 
NATO efforts are under way to harness this as an integrated NATO electronic warfare 
capability. The challenge is to standardize procedures and to develop control and 
communications.61 NATO’s Consultation, Command and Control Agency is currently 
preoccupied with the problem of integrating data from a wide variety of non-standard 
systems.62 
 For both NATO and the EU, the challenge is not just a matter of the ‘new’ 
European states, but also of widening patterns of cooperation. The NATO Special 
Committee has also facilitated security gatherings among the 46 states that belong to the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), including countries such as Morocco. In 2002 
they established an EAPC/PfP Intelligence Liaison Unit which embraced the Partnership 
for Peace (PfP). At the same time a treaty was finalized on the protection of classified 
information exchanged between NATO and the EU. Like NATO, the Council of the 
European Union has a security committee which pays growing attention to the exchange 
of classified EU information with third countries and international organizations.63
 
Divergent analytical frameworks 
Although it is apparent that transatlantic intelligence problems exist at all levels, they are 
most visible at the top, where intelligence meets broad issues of strategy. Different 
alliance members employ widely divergent analytical frameworks to explain current 
developments. On 9 February 2004, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld addressed 
this issue directly and offered some retrospective comments on NATO’s fragmented 
response to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. He identified ‘the fact that NATO does not have 
common intelligence’ as a key source of its difficulties. Rumsfeld’s contention was that 
states that create common or shared intelligence estimates enjoy a more joined-up view 
of the world, and are thus more likely to generate convergent policies. He continued: 
 
To the extent we are all working off the same set of facts, or roughly the same set of facts, the 
people from our respective countries tend to come to roughly the same conclusions, and to the 
extent we’re not working off the same set of facts, we tend not to; and it seems to me that it may 
very well be that one thing NATO might do would be to do a better job of seeing that the 
intelligence capabilities of the respective countries are brought together and that the people in 
NATO and the capitals of NATO countries are kept tuned into those threats and the kinds of 
capabilities that we as free people face. We’re much more likely to get a faster common 
understanding to the extent we have a reasonably similar perspective with respect to what the 
facts are.64 
 
At one level this could be read as a wistful expression of Rumsfeld’s desire that 
European countries would go along with Washington’s view of what the facts are. At 
another level it contains the interesting proposition that joint intelligence estimates are 
likely to be significant in encouraging convergent policy among allies.65 In relation to 
Iraq in 2003 the facts do not seem to support this assertion. Indeed, one could argue that 
on the specific issue of Iraqi WMD, almost all western intelligence services, including 
the German BND, firmly believed that Iraq had some significant capability in this area. 
This universal belief did not produce a common alliance policy.66
 Notwithstanding this observation, Rumsfeld’s remarks about the relationship 
between shared strategic estimates and alliance policy raise interesting questions. To 
what extent are the strategic appreciations generated by NATO countries about the 
current situation divergent or even contradictory? Superficially, western security agencies 
and indeed academic commentators share an agreed narrative about the recent past, 
which has indeed underpinned efforts towards greater cooperation. Some 50 years of 
political violence by leftist or separatist groups had accustomed security agencies to 
terrorism as a form of political communication. Purposive political violence was 
unpleasant, but the scale of risk was relatively modest, certainly by comparison with 
military threats. Moreover, the explicit agenda and local focus of these groups offered 
some scope for engagement. The aim was to draw such groups away from military 
strategies towards political rehabilitation. Arguably these efforts met with some success, 
in both Northern Ireland and the Middle East.67
 In both North America and in Europe there is a broad acceptance that there has 
been a ‘transformation of terrorism’ over the last decade. This is often characterized as a 
shift from a political terrorism, with tactical or instrumental objectives, to a religious 
terrorism, whose aims may not be political and whose violence has no obvious upper 
limit. Although this was closely associated with the exodus of a quarter of a million 
radicalized mujahedin from Afghanistan, increasing violence was not exclusively 
Islamic. Tokyo suffered an attack on the subway using sarin gas by the Aum Shin Rikyo 
cult, which had reportedly identified Washington DC as its next target. There seemed 
little possibility of political engagement with these groups.68 As the British Home 
Secretary remarked in March 2004, ‘We are in a serious business here. These people do 
not negotiate, they do not have a platform, they do not have a political stance that we can 
talk to them about, and they do not have fear of prosecution or punishment.’69 
 However, western security agencies do not agree on their broad analysis of the 
‘drivers’ of the new terrorism. Divergent analysis of the current situation is rooted as 
much in particular intelligence cultures as in discordant political visions. American 
intelligence agencies have always preferred to focus upon a single homogeneous 
opponent. For this reason, the American intelligence community found the shift to the 
post-Cold-War era particularly disconcerting and dealt with it spectacularly badly. 
Innumerable reports on reforming intelligence to meet the challenges of the post-Cold-
War world piled up, but little of substance changed. The early 1990s were characterized 
by Fukuyamist emphasis upon economic competition between liberal democratic states 
and increasing anxiety about economic espionage by ‘friendly spies’. The nefarious 
activities of the Japanese and the French were frequently discussed. By the mid-1990s 
this preoccupation had been overtaken by improbable but satisfying predictions of a 
Chinese naval challenge to American hegemony in the Pacific. This in turn has now been 
replaced by the uncompromising nature of radical Islam.70
 It is entirely consistent with this paradigm—a search for specific enemies—that 
the United States has viewed the current upsurge in terrorism as a ‘war on America’ 
rooted in particular regimes. Most of the US National Intelligence Estimate material of 
the last ten years remains classified, but the broad outlook is captured by recent testimony 
offered by the US National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, on what she called ‘the 
source of the problem’. Rice spoke about the way in which the United States had rejected 
‘a narrow war’ against Al-Qaeda and the Taleban in Afghanistan in favour of ‘a broad 
war against a global menace’. But, ironically, this supposedly ‘broader’ effort remains, in 
American eyes, a war against specific regimes. She continued: 
 
The United States and our allies are disrupting terrorist operations, cutting off their funding, and 
hunting down terrorists one-by-one. Their world is getting smaller. The terrorists have lost a 
home-base and training camps in Afghanistan. The Governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia 
now pursue them with energy and force . . . Because we acted in Iraq, Saddam Hussein will never 
again use weapons of mass destruction against his people or his neighbors. And we have 
convinced Libya to give up all its WMD-related programs and materials. And as we attack the 
threat at its sources, we are also addressing its roots. 
 
 The United States is not alone in viewing ‘the roots of terror’ through this prism. 
Surprisingly, given their mutual political tensions, French agencies have followed the 
Americans in characterizing the drivers of current terrorism in similar terms, but this has 
not encouraged convergent policy.71 
 By contrast, other West European states have tended to view the upsurge in 
religious violence as a symptom of wider problems in the international system. In Britain 
and Germany this phenomenon is often identified by political intelligence analysts as the 
price of decades of diplomatic failure in the Middle East, sometimes in a post-imperial 
context. Security agencies tend to locate this failure in the context of ‘problems of 
globalization’. Globalization, they argue, has resulted in cultural provocation and 
economic dislocation, rendering diverse communities more receptive to the message of 
messianic terror.72 Moreover, globalization offered antagonized groups access to new 
weapons with which to pursue their objectives. Oddly, the networked world of the 
twenty-first century is well suited to religious movements which are not state-based and 
which exploit the very transnationalism that developed states have facilitated. A 
globalizing world is less amenable to state-based security agencies that have depended on 
boundaries to create choke points through which security threats can be tracked and 
monitored.73 
 Yet other countries, particularly EU accession states and NATO enlargement 
states, remain on the periphery of this debate. Although most of the ‘new’ European 
partners publicly backed the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, this had little to do with 
their interpretation of the structure of terrorism. Terrorism remains quite low on the 
agenda in Prague and Budapest, beset as the Czech and Hungarian governments are with 
their own security issues that have little to do with international jihad. While these new 
member states have been active in providing troops for expeditionary forces, their 
contributions are primarily symbols of commitment to European institutions.74
 
Conclusion 
Intelligence cooperation is the most important weapon in the struggle to contain the 
‘new’ terrorism, but its significance is even greater than that. Across a range of post-Cold 
War issues, globalization has undermined many of the familiar mechanisms by which 
states formerly provided their populations with security. Indeed, organized crime, drug-
trafficking, money-laundering and immigration have become ‘securitized’ precisely 
because of their increasingly transnational character. With the erosion of the familiar 
national border post, states have turned to more proactive measures to protect their 
populations, and these efforts are more intelligence-led. In London the recognition of 
these trends was apparent as early as 1998 in efforts not only to reverse the post-Cold 
War contraction in the UK intelligence and security services but to expand them. At the 
operational level, prompt assessment of and response to information is now at a premium. 
It is essential that ways are discovered to share precise information rapidly and 
confidently, without inundating partners with torrents of useless data. Discriminating 
between patterns of data-sharing will also help us to protect our privacy while reducing 
the problem of global anonymity. This is important if we are to meet the aspirations of 
our democratic societies, who do not want to pay an unacceptably high tariff for their 
continued security. 
 Michael Herman has sagely remarked that in the field of intelligence, 
‘international exchanges are a necessity for international society.’75 However, the 
prospects for convergent analytical frameworks are less promising. Politicians are 
remarkably impervious to objective intelligence and the reporting of contrary evidence 
rarely impedes the path of a determined policy-maker. Donald Rumsfeld’s assertion that 
if we are all working off ‘roughly the same set of facts’ we will come to ‘roughly the 
same conclusions’ is certainly not borne out by history, or indeed by recent events. 
Transatlantic intelligence cooperation has achieved some remarkable things over the 
years, but it is not about to deliver greater alliance cohesion. Moreover, across an 
increasingly diverse western alliance, the interface between strategic intelligence analysis 
and the core executive is changing at different speeds. In some places analysis is still kept 
at arm’s length from the policy process;76 in others, objective intelligence reporting is 
likely to sit increasingly awkwardly with presidential styles of governance which prefer 
subjective policy advice.77 
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